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The Political Causes of the 
Asian Economic Crisis 
JURGEN RUDOLPH AND INDIRA ARUMUGAM 
'In nearly every economic crisis, the root cause is political, not 
economic. ' 
Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, addres- 
sing a top group of US CEOs at the FORTUNE 500 
Forum in Boston (qtd. in Chowdhury and Paul 1997) 
The havoc that the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s 
wreaked seems to be on the wane. Economies seem to be re- 
covering and tense political situations seem to be subsiding. 
However, the political contributions to the crisis have yet to be 
sufficiently addressed. These political causes are not as immedi- 
ately plausible as many of the economic and financial ones. The 
use of the term 'political cause' in this paper has its origin in the 
widespread claims that economic and financial factors caused 
the crisis. As it is possible to cast serious doubt on the concept 
of cause, it is used here largely as a counter-concept and as a 
rhetorical device. The term, however, should not detract from 
the argument that corruption (including electoral manipulation) 
was a significant contributory factor to the crisis. This 
relationship is then augmented by the fact that the states most 
affected by the crisis are not yet fully fledged democracies. Such 
states tend to spawn a dependent judiciary, an insufficient 
separation of powers, controlled media and an underdeveloped 
civil society. 
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There is growing empirical evidence to support the idea of a 
positive relationship between economic and political freedom. 
While economic freedom helps to establish the conditions for 
political freedom by promoting the growth of prosperous 
middle and working classes, successful market economies also 
require political freedom to provide a barrier against economic 
cronyism and other anti-competitive and inefficient practices 
(Karatnycky 1999: 122). 
There are intricate inter-relationships between democratic 
institutions-such as parliament, an independent judiciary, free 
media and a thriving civil society-and low levels of cor- 
ruption. Consequently, corrupt ruling elites find these demo- 
cratic institutions to be nuisances. However, transparency and 
accountability appear to be fundamental requirements, not only 
for a consolidated democracy, but also for the competitive 
functioning of national economies. A lack of government 
accountability has contributed to the crisis, and rights such as 
Asian NGOs-particularly freedom of expression, association, 
and assembly-are critical to the kind of governance that may 
not only put the region's economies back on track (Jones 1999: 
9), but also diminish the probability of future crises. 
As a preliminary study, this paper will not track exactly how 
political factors affected the national economies of a specific 
'crisis economy'. There is no implication of a direct and strict 
causal relationship between the flouting of democratic 
principles and the economic crisis. It would be spurious to 
adopt a post hoc ergo procter hocl type of argument. However, 
general considerations of how politics influences economic 
performance are offered. 
Many politico-economic elites argue for a strictly economic 
view of good governance. In this view, human rights consist 
primarily of access to basic necessities, and material prosperity 
should be the principal consideration, not political maturity. 
Such a view contravenes the conception of good governance as 
put forward by the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the United Nations (UN). The UN defines good 
governance as 'systems of government required to encourage 
people's involvement in decision-making, stimulate economic 
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growth and ensure that the benefits of that growth reach all 
segments of society'. (UNDP 2000). Many of the elements that 
this paper argues as contributing to the crisis and its 
prolongation are also emphasized by the UN, thus eschewing a 
strictly materialistic conception of good governance and rights. 
Following that, this paper argues that good governance as 
defined by many of these elites does not, and must not, 
preclude democratization. Otherwise, good governance will be 
a mere euphemism for authoritarianism. In fact, they are, and 
must be, mutually dependent. This view is also shared by 
Korean President Kim Dae Jung, who has traced the problems 
of his country to the 'placing of economic development ahead 
of democracy' and argues that 'democracy and a free market 
economy can and must flourish together, as one' (quoted in Lee 
2000: 177). How applicable is Kim's observation to the other 
'crisis economies' in the region? 
This paper resists the temptation to posit that any of the 
aforementioned candidates for 'political causes' triggered the 
crash. But it will assert that these were contributory factors to 
the crash and 'contagion', and that they prolonged the crisis. It 
will cast doubt on two notions that are popular even two years 
after the advent of the crisis. One being that the crisis was a 
result of purely financial or economic factors and the other that 
countries such as Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia were all 
doing just fine until the greedy forces of globalization disrupted 
them. It is argued that the lack of sound democratic practices 
provided suitable host conditions for the proliferation of a 
myriad of economic ills. Examples will be cited mainly from the 
five countries most affected by the crisis, namely Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and the Philippines. 
The potential political causes refer to incomplete democra- 
tization. This paper will use Larry Diamond's definition of 
liberal democracy which addresses the fallacy of electoralism 
that underpin most other definitions (e.g. Schumpeter 1947: 
269). Diamond's definition goes beyond regular, free and fair 
electoral competition and universal suffrage, which is only a 
part of full political democracy. He identifies necessary require- 
ments, the absence of which will be discussed as the possible 
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political causes of the crisis. Diamond sees liberal democracy 
incorporating the constraint of executive power by the autono- 
mous power of other government institutions. Civil liberties 
(such as freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publi- 
cation, assembly, demonstration and petition) are effectively 
protected by an independent, non-discriminatory judiciary, 
whose decisions are enforced and respected by other centres of 
power. The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified deten- 
tion, exile, terror, torture or undue interference in their personal 
lives. Diamond's definition also encompasses associational free- 
dom and the existence of a diverse array of autonomous associ- 
ations, movements and groupings. Alternative sources of infor- 
mation must also exist, such as independent media to which 
citizens should have ready access (Diamond 1999: 10-13). 
It cannot be denied that economic factors contributed to the 
crisis. Within the economic discourse, 'external aspects' (fixed 
exchange rates, high interest rates and excessive borrowing 
from abroad) are perceived to have been among the important 
causal factors of the crisis. However, many academics like Karl 
Jackson (1999: 5 )  have argued that the crisis would not have 
occurred without the following 'internal aspects': 'inadequate 
supervisory institutions, traditional banking practices, and, 
most of all, poor investment decisions made by the private 
sector of each country." 
Much of the economic malaise can be attributed to a general 
lack of transparency and accountability, which rendered 
inadequate economic and financial policies possible in the first 
place. The worst-affected countries generally exhibited less 
transparent and less effective corporate and financial regulatory 
systems; in particular, there was a lack of public participation in 
reviewing financial arrangements (Sen 199913: 9). It is the basic 
hypothesis of this paper that this lack of transparency and 
accountability applies to the prevailing systems of government 
in the region in general, albeit in varying degrees. In the 
following discussion of the political causes of the crisis, the 
attempt will be made to show that a lack of transparency and 
accountability, at the very least, greatly aggravated the crisis. 
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Political Causes 
Corruption, Collusion, Cronyism 
Complicity between governments, bureaucracies and con- 
glomerates characterizes much of Asian politics. Indonesia 
under Suharto was the region's most corrupt country (see 
Transparency International 1998) and a prime example of a 
kleptocratic state.3 While the Indonesian excesses are extreme, it 
is argued that collusion and corruption are almost endemic to 
the worst-affected 'crisis economies'. Market-economy systems 
are only partially in place in many Asian countries. Often, there 
is no fully fledged competition due to monopolies, oligopolies, 
corruption, nepotism, favouritism, state interventionism and 
protectionism. In the aftermath of the crisis, crony capitalism 
which eschews control and transparency whilst nurturing 
paternalism and nepotism has fallen into great disrepute. 
Asian political systems in general are not transparent. 
Constitutional principles such as separation of powers or 
guarantees of basic rights are only partially in place. National 
differences notwithstanding, the power is largely with politico- 
economic elites who are beyond almost any control. From the 
monopolistic enterprises of the Suharto children to the chaebol 
family-based conglomerates in South Korea, Asian politics is 
characterized by conglomerates that are intimately linked to the 
governments and bureaucracies. These ruling elites consider 
transparency and accountability as embodied by powerful 
parliaments, a free press, an independent judiciary and the 
control and supervision of cartels and banks to be threatening. 
Cronyism and corruption have often been cited as major 
factors in the Asian crisis. Franqois Godement (1999: 55) has 
noted correctly that 'the past implication of foreign firms and 
businessmen in the pattern of corruption makes many protests 
sound hypocritical.' Nonetheless, cronyism has perverted the 
relationship between state and market and has undermined the 
sound economic fundamentals of East and Southeast Asia. 
According to the Asian Development Bank's annual report, 
'corruption has added 20 to 100 per cent to the cost of procuring 
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government goods and services in several Asian countries' 
(Straits Times, 27 April 1999). In Thailand itself, households 
shell out an annual US$625 million to bribe-taking bureaucrats 
(East 2000). 
The implication of corruption in the crisis has been par- 
ticularly forcefully applied to the Indonesian case. Apart from 
rampant political corruption, the depth of the Indonesian crisis 
was also attributable to other political factors such as the 
political instability surrounding Suharto and his impending 
succession, the lack of good governance, and the repression of 
all political opposition (Sadli 1999: 16-18; McLeod 1999: 218). 
Although most of these missing 'political fundamentals' were 
observable during the entire duration of the long Suharto era, 
there seems to be an expiration date on such repressive forms of 
governance, especially in the context of a fast-changing region 
with the concomitant pressures of industrialization and 
globalization. The Suharto regime certainly fits into the 
category of a 'performance regime' that lacked non-economic 
sources of legitimacy. This type of regime has shown a 
tendency to collapse during an economic crisis (Jackson 199913: 
17). In addition, the Suharto regime had a strongly personalistic 
or sultanistic element which also made it more fragile (see 
Forrester and May 1999: 136). 
Having said this, the role of corruption in Indonesia's fall can 
hardly be overestimated. For decades, the country was led like 
a family enterprise, with ex-President Suharto watching over 
politics and his six children dominating the economy. Aspirants 
to big business in Indonesia had to get the costly blessings of 
the Suharto clan. Michael Backman (1999) has identified 1,247 
separate companies in which the Suharto family held a 
significant stake. Time magazine has alleged that former 
President Suharto - who, as president of Indonesia, earned 
Rp15 million (US$1,800) a month - and his family are worth 
US$15 billion. 
The fast-growing business enterprises of Suharto's children, 
grandchildren, relatives and close associates were granted 
extraordinary favours by the Indonesian government. These 
companies did not have to compete for prime government 
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contracts. They also had ready access to cheap funds from state 
banks (McLeod 1999: 214ff.). The Indonesian government under 
Suharto served the interests of a narrow elite rather than the 
public at large, and rampant corruption came to infect all areas 
of public life (McLeod 1999: 215; Schwarz 1994: 133-161). The 
Indonesian case is an extreme one. But almost everywhere in 
the region, politics, administration, the private sector and banks 
are inextricably intertwined to varying degrees. Thailand, on 
the other hand, has been far more democratic than Suharto's 
Indonesia because of the success of the Thai civic movement 
against General Suchinda Kraprayoon's coup d16tat. But 
rampant corruption also taints Thailand, largely taking the 
form of competitive clientelism as opposed to Indonesia's 
monopolistic clientelism. While in Indonesia, power was concen- 
trated in President Suharto and the officers and bureaucrats 
nearest to him, in Thailand different portions of the business 
elite competed for patronage from different parts of the political 
elite (see Doner and Ramsay 1999; Jackson 199913). 
Some adherents of 'Asian values' have argued that the 
relative economic backwardness of the Philippines is due to its 
Americanized democratic governance. However, Ferdinand 
Marcos-who was initially popularly elected but went on to 
become a dictator during his 20-year rule-has to be largely 
blamed for this country's economic shortcomings. Marco's 
nationalistic crony capitalism protected various sectors of the 
economy from outside competition to the benefit of his friends 
and the long-term detriment of the nation (Mallet 1999: 278). 
Marcos and his cronies looted the country, and 'the hundreds of 
millions siphoned away translated into billions in lost 
opportunities' (Delhaise 1998: 162). Politics in the Philippines is 
still heavily influenced by big land-owning families, which 
have vast powers of patronage. Corruption reigns in the 
Philippines to the extent that policemen have been implicated 
in the kidnappings of ethnic Chinese businessmen. 
In Malaysia, an ethnicity-based economic policy which 
favours indigenous bumiputras (mostly ethnic Malays) has 
inaugurated a new generation of Malay entrepreneurs. Much of 
their success is based on protectionism and favouritism, 
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although the extent of this collusion has not reached the 
excesses of Indonesia. Nonetheless, Malaysia's Prime Minister 
Mahathir, in a speech to UMNO members about 'money 
politics', wept and said he feared that corruption, if left un- 
checked, would 'destroy the country' (Mallet 1999: 255). Former 
Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who is serving a jail 
term for corruption, has claimed to be the victim of a plot by 
government leaders, who are responding to his threat to expose 
their corrupt practices. 
The success of many Asian businesses can be attributed not 
to their sound management practices but to their collusion with 
a corrupt government. Malaysia ranked in the middle, while 
Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia languished at or near 
the bottom with regard to corruption in the Global Competitive 
Survey (see Sachs 1999: 12). Whole economies were protected 
from competition both by formal laws and by the informal 
influence of government cronies. The rise of a class of 
businessmen doing business based on 'know-who' rather than 
'know-how' proved ultimately disastrous. Collusion between 
government and business has become increasingly untenable in 
an era of global competition. This was once disguised by 
decades of fast economic growth but has eventually come to the 
fore. 
Before we conclude this section, two relationships deserve 
consideration: the first between democracy and corruption. At 
first glance, there does not appear to be an unequivocal and 
direct correlation between lack of corruption and democracy. 
For instance, the world's largest democracy, India, is plagued 
by corruption. In Salman Rushdie's novel, The Moor's Last Sigh, 
one of the characters sardonically offers his definition of 
modern Indian democracy ('one man one bribe') and of what he 
calls the 'Indian Theory of Relativity' ('everything is for 
relatives') (Rushdie 1997: 21). Singapore, on the other 
hand-which is frequently placed in the 'soft authoritarian' 
camp-is relatively outstanding in its honesty and efficiency. 
This has been achieved by an uncompromising anti-corruption 
policy, strict policing of the population, and the very high 
salaries paid to top civil servants and government  minister^.^ In 
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comparison, the two most democratic states in Southeast Asia, 
Thailand and the Philippines, are riddled with corruption. 
It is difficult to draw precisely a direct relationship between 
democracy and corruption. Democracy does not guarantee lack 
of corruption. On the other hand, non-democratic governance 
permits high levels of corruption due to the concentration of 
power and other ills, such as repressed media, a compliant 
judiciary and a general absence of checks and balances. In a 
democratic country, institutions such as a free press and an 
independent judiciary expose and punish corruption, thereby 
minimizing its incidence. 
Huntington has argued that while democracy breeds cor- 
ruption among political parties and politicians in the short term, 
it also allows strong political parties to develop which will 
counter corruption in the long term (see Pasuk and Sungsidh, 
1996: 21). This hypothesis would be in accordance with the 
assessment by many political scientists that relatively young 
democracies, such as Thailand and the Philippines, still exhibit 
numerous democrati'c deficiencies and thus have a long way to 
go. However, corruption constitutes a major threat to the future 
of democracy itself in many parts of the world, not only in East 
and Southeast Asia. It is therefore ill advised to dismiss such a 
threat as temporary or as merely a means to the end that is 
liberal democracy. 
The second relationship, that between corruption and 
development, should be considered in the light of the oft-voiced 
contention that corruption and collusion-although deplorable 
from a moral point of view-speed up economic development. 
For instance, Philippe Delhaise (1998: 104) opines that collusion 
between politicians, big business and banks leads to' much 
dynamism for which 'corruption at the top is perhaps a small 
price to pay'. This is the strong version of a strand of thought 
which denies any negative impact of corruption on 
development. In fact, it views corruption as having a positive 
impact on development. There also exist weaker versions of this 
argument. These run along the line that although not good in 
itself, corruption does not appear to have a detrimental effect 
on a nation's economy. For example, Hal Hill points to the 
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observation that corrupt administrations (in East and Southeast 
Asia as well as elsewhere) have presided over rapid economic 
development in the past, in the process earning such triumph- 
alist epithets as 'Asian Miracle', 'The Asian Century' and 'Asian 
Tigers': China, Taiwan and Indonesia are cases in point. These 
arguments, however, are less than convincing. 
In fact, corruption has a multiplicity of bad effects on both 
economic and political development. Although the fall-out 
from years of fraudulent economic and political activities was 
not immediately apparent, it would not be incorrect to argue 
that such activities laid the foundation for the crisis of 1997. For 
even amidst the economic boom, the ill effects of corruption 
were still present, albeit disguised by skyrocketing stock figures 
and flourishing property markets. Shang and Sievers (1999) 
argue that contrary to Delhaise's and Hill's convictions, 'Asian 
performance would have been better had levels of corruption 
been lower. In this sense, corruption in parts of Asia caused the 
regions to underperform when compared to potential accom- 
plishment.' They calculate that 'if the Philippines, for example, 
could reduce its corruption levels to those of Singapore, it 
would increase, all other things being equal, its investment/ 
gross domestic product (GDP) ratio by 6.6 percentage points 
-quite a substantial increase.' Such countries are also finding it 
tougher to shake off the effects of the crisis compared to those 
that are relatively free of corruption. 
So far, we have hypothesized that corruption is a serious 
problem in all five crisis economies, albeit in varying degrees. 
Moreover, we have seen that democracies are more likely to 
combat corruption than non-democratic states, and that there 
appears to be a strong correlation between economic develop- 
ment and economic freedom. The complex relationships be- 
tween corruption, democracy and development will be further 
evaluated in the final section of this paper. 
Electoral Manipulation 
Electoral irregularities may have played a much neglected role 
in the genesis of the Asian economic crisis. Inadequate electoral 
systems play into the hands of ruling parties. In many pseudo- 
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democratic nations, electoral fraud, manipulation and massive 
vote-buying are common practice and prevent a change in 
government. Electoral manipulation is a form of political 
corruption and constitutes an antithesis to the conduct of fair 
and free elections. As such, it contradicts a responsible use of 
power (cf. Leones and Moraleda 1998: 330). 
In Thailand, the electoral system constituted a key weakness. 
Under the pre-crisis Constitution, the 200-member Senate was 
appointed by the prime minister, while the lower house was 
composed of 393 MPs from multi-member constituencies based 
on a ratio of one MP to 150,000 people. A further weakness lay 
in the fact that provincial constituencies supplied approxi- 
mately 80 per cent of the seats, with one-third of votes coming 
from the impoverished Northeast region alone. Doner and 
Ramsay (1999: 189) argue convincingly that 'such a system 
encouraged patronage-based rather than policy-based parties'. 
Linked to the electoral system was Thailand's combination of a 
parliamentary structure with multiple weak parties. Prime 
ministers had to struggle to keep their coalitions together. As a 
consequence, major policy initiatives, such as those demanded 
by the crash of 1997, were extraordinarily difficult to undertake. 
Due to money politics, electoral success is largely determined 
by the availability of funds. Several recent prime ministers have 
taken office largely because of the number and power of their 
political allies. For instance, the ex-prime minister Banharn 
Silpa-archa started his term of office with the nickname 'Mr 
Automatic Teller Machine' because of his infamous vote-buying 
record (Sachsenroder 1998: 14). 
The revenue from corruption is often a crucial element in 
building and maintaining a politician's power-base. Once in 
office, a politician must be able to maintain a flow of funds to 
his supporters and constituents in order to prove his worth and 
consolidate his chances of re-election (Pasuk and Sungsidh 
1996: 15). In Thailand, there is the figure of the jao pho ('god- 
father') who has come to play a crucial role in parliamentary 
elections. The extremely well-connected 'godfathers' sit in 
positions of authority in local administration, but are not neces- 
sarily themselves in parliament. However, they may dictate the 
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voting behaviour of several MPs for whom they have helped to 
secure election. The jao pho compete with the military and the 
bureaucracy for a share in the 'corruption money' (Pasuk and 
Sungsidh 1996: 57ff.). 
It has been estimated that Thai politicians spent US$800 
million buying votes during the 1996 election campaign, de- 
scribed as the dirtiest ever. Not only votes but politicians with 
potential can also be bought. Other irregularities are connected 
with the preparation of the voter list, voting at the polling 
station and the counting of votes (Anusorn 1998: 425-437). 
One of the most damaging aspects of this system was that 
politicians are under intense pressure to generate cash flows 
while in office-usually from corrupt business deals-to cover 
the vote-buying and network-maintenance expenses. Due to the 
weak political party system, party and faction leaders are also 
compelled to generate funds to hold their members together. As 
Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew recently pointed out, Thai politi- 
cians, who held personal stakes in many troubled financial 
institutions, have displayed 'a natural reluctance to discipline 
them' (Chowdhury and Paul 1997). The good news is that most 
voters in Bangkok at least are no longer prepared to tolerate 
corrupt politicians. 
In pre-crisis Indonesia, there were two different types of 
elections: the general election and the presidential election. 
During the general elections-known as 'a festival of democ- 
racy' but bearing little semblance to the real thing-only three 
political parties were allowed to compete for the 425 seats of the 
House of Representatives (DPR) or parliament. Another 75 
were appointed to represent the armed forces. Every five years, 
the 500 MPs were joined by another 500 members appointed by 
the president to form the People's Consultative Assembly 
(MPR), whose 1,000 members then elected the president and 
vice-president. The polls were widely believed to be largely 
rigged. In the general elections in 1997, double vote-counting 
was rife, and civil servants (for whom it was compulsory to 
vote for Golkar, the ruling party) were posted special extra 
voting cards, allowing them to vote at work as well as in their 
home town (Kearney 1999). 
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In Malaysia, gerrymandering is common. It seems to be a 
common practice that opposition strongholds are carved out 
and integrated into areas controlled by the ruling Barisan 
Nasional. Elections in Malaysia are less than fair as campaigns 
are conducted in a way that tends strongly to favour the ruling 
coalition. The ruling coalition makes excessive use of funds, 
abuses its control of the country's leading newspapers, 
television and radio networks, and misuses the government's 
machinery (as for extensive gerrymandering) during the 
campaign period (Gomez 1998). 
In the Philippines, 'turncoatism'-the switching of mem- 
bership of political parties-is based on a less direct form of 
'candidate buying' than Thailand's. The administration or the 
dominant party deliberately dangles access to government 
funds (in particular, discretionary funds or expenditures for 
projects, popularly known as pork barrel) before opposition 
politicians as a political carrot (Leones and Moraleda 1998: 
313ff.). There are many forms of electoral irregularities in the 
.Philippines, but massive vote-buying is the most prevalent and 
destructive. While the 1998 election was 'the freest, fairest, and 
least violent election in Philippine history', owing much to the 
vigilance of the media and NGOs, serious electoral inade- 
quacies remain. For example, the use of 'write-in ballots' 
-which contain the names of neither candidates nor parties, 
but only a list of offices alongside blank lines on which the 
voters fill in candidates' names-prevents illiterates from 
voting, encourages extreme personalism, and constitutes also a 
disincentive to party-system development (Montinola 1999: 
127-138). 
South Korea is infamous for its history of political 'slush 
funds'. During his presidency, Roh Tae Woo received political 
donations amounting to about 500 billion won (US$640 million) 
from more than 30 Korean business tycoons. Incidentally, the 30 
largest chaebol are said to control 85 per cent of industrial South 
Korea (Delhaise 1998: 102). Interestingly, Roh's opponent Kim 
Dae Jung, who has become president in the meantime, has 
confessed that he received 2 billion won (US$2.5 million) from 
Roh in 1992. Roh and more than 30 business tycoons, politicians 
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and ex-bureaucrats were put on trial on charges of graft and 
I corruption (Kim Y.H. 1998: 152-155). The results featured in the 
world press for weeks, not unreasonably scaring some authori- 
tarian and corrupt leaders. 
I The formations of political parties in East and Southeast Asia 
I 
are mostly deficient as they follow personalistic and clientelistic 
I 
structures, not political orientations bound by values and ideas. 
I Moreover, organizational structures within most political 
parties in East and Southeast Asia 'seem at least to be fragile, if 
1 not completely volatile' (Sachsenroder 1998: 1). Consequently, 
' the party systems are unstable. For most countries in the region, 
political parties and democratic institutions in the opposition 
are weak, unstructured, suppressed and marginalized. By 
contrast, established ruling parties of authoritarian regimes are 
centralistic, undemocratic, repressive, manipulative and 
corrupt. East Asia has developed a 'big business party' system. 
Vote-buying has been perfected, and parties that have remained 
in power for a long time have built business empires which 
provide continuing financial security (Sachsenroder 1998: 20). 
Indonesia's Golkar, Malaysia's UMNO and Taiwan's 
Kuomintang appear to be among the wealthiest political parties 
in the world. 
It may not be immediately obvious as to how electoral sys- 
tems could have contributed to the Asian crisis. We have 
already noted that electoral manipulation is yet another form of 
political corruption. Thus, the arguments put forward in the 
section on corruption very much apply to electoral irregu- 
larities as well. Much of the corruption evident in political 
administrations begins even before these regimes assume office. 
They have their origins in the electoral process itself and even 
become imperative to the maintenance of political office, as 
politicians seek to recoup their massive outlay for the elections 
and retain their supporters. While the severe economic damage 
done by electoral irregularities such as vote-buying may be less 
obvious than other forms of corruption, they are nonetheless 
very real. 
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Integration of Powers, Dependent Judiciary 
In almost all of the countries in the region, rule of law is under- 
developed, and independence of the judiciary is not a given. 
Interpretations of the definition of judicial independence and 
the role of the judiciary can differ markedly from liberal views 
on the subject. The legal structure is also frequently thought of 
as 'the handmaiden of the market' or as 'one means of mana- 
ging and regulating civil society' (Jayasuriya 1999b: 4/18). Often 
there are blatant discrepancies between constitutional law and 
constitutional reality. There may be law and rule of the power- 
ful, but no separation of powers. 
Jayasuriya has drawn attention to the situation in pre-crisis 
Indonesia, where 'a division of power within the executive 
rather than a separation of power between the executive and the 
judiciary' seems to prevail. The executive dictates to the legis- 
lative, controls the nomination and dismissal of judges, and 
oversees the administration of justice. The relationship between 
the judiciary and the executive is based more on a patrimonial 
rather than corporatist model. In fact, the rule of law can serve 
to entrench and consolidate public or state power (Jayasuriya 
1999a: 191ff., 199933: 3). This is not restricted to Indonesia. 
Among other Asian countries, the five 'crisis economies' all 
ranked poorly on judicial independence in the Global Compe- 
titiveness Survey (Sachs 1999). Legislation follows the interests 
of the powerful executive and is manipulated to legalize state 
actions, even at the cost of nepotism and corruption among the 
police, the prosecution service and judges. The judiciary is often 
corrupt and subservient. Recent investigations by the National 
Law Commission (KHN) have found that almost 80 per cent of 
Indonesian Supreme Court judges are tainted by bribes. (Straits 
Times, 26 August 2000). 
Tough media laws only guarantee reporting that has been 
sanctioned by the government. In Indonesia, the main govern- 
ment means for securing a compliant press is the press publi- 
cation enterprise permit, issued by the Department of Infor- 
mation. It replaced the existing system of publishing licences in 
1992 and represented a greatly augmented censorship arsenal 
that allowed the government to shut down entire publishing 
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enterprises as well as individual publications by judging them 
to be detrimental to national interests (Schwarz 1994: 239). 
Apart from prestigious 'mega projects' which contributed to 
the economy's overheating, Malaysia also boasts 'mega defama- 
tion suits' brought by the powerful, which severely impinge on 
freedom of expression and press freedom. Following the 
example of British law, ~ a l a y s i a n  judges are empowered to jail 
their own critics for 'scandalizing the court'. 
The Malaysian legal system hBs become increasingly intoler- 
ant of criticism. In a famous case, opposition MP Lim Guan Eng 
was jailed for 18 months when he criticized Malaysia's legal 
process for stigmatizing a girl who had accused a powerful 
official in Dr Mahathir's administration (Pereira 1999). 
The judiciary itself has not been spared from attacks from the 
government. In 1988, Dr Mahathir conducted a 'purge' of his 
country's most senior judges, whereby the lord president and 
two Supreme Court judges were removed from office under 
unprecedented and suspicious circumstances (Gomez 1998: 
273). The dismissed lord president, Salleh Abas, then lamented 
that 'our judiciary is in shambles; it will take a whole generation 
to rebuild it' (Khoo 1999: 221). After this incident, the powers of 
the judiciary have been circumscribed to benefit the executive 
to such an extent that Gomez, writing before the crisis, ob- 
served a 'growing scepticism about the capacity of the judicial 
system to administer justice' (1998: 273). His observation turned 
out to be rather prophetic as Malaysia's standing has been bat- 
tered by the conviction and imprisonment of former Deputy 
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. The black eye, which was 
caused by the then Chief of Police, has become the symbol of 
Keadilan, the National Justice Party headed by Anwar's wife, 
Wan Azizah. 
Generally, there is a dearth of laws to protect the consti- 
tutionally enshrined political freedoms, human, civil and 
individual rights, and to guard against discrimination on the 
grounds of gender, race/ethnicity, religion, etc. What few laws 
there are, in theory, are often flouted in practice in the name of 
national security. For example, security acts allow for the 
indefinite detention of political enemies without judicial 
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proceedings. The Indonesian military's suppression of 
rebellions in East Timor and Aceh abounded with 'extra-judicial 
killings, unlawful detentions, forced confessions and torture, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Indonesian legal code 
provides protection from all these abuses' (Schwarz 1994: 247). 
Legislation is also frequently impaired by insufficient training 
of judges, the lack of clear-cut rules for the hearing of evidence, 
the presumption of guilt until innocence has been proven, the 
tacit permission of torture in order to force confessions, and the 
absence of fair trials. Prior to the fall of Suharto, there had been 
serious doubts voiced about the value of legal guarantees in a 
political system where candidates for the legislature had to go 
through a political screening. 
In a Thai survey of popular opinion, the Police Department 
was rated as the most corrupt department of government. In a 
study of more than 4,000 households, it was found that one in 
10 household had paid bribes in the last year; on average 
payments amounted to just under US$250 with a smaller 
number of people saying they had paid out US$2,500 or more. 
Almost 90 per cent of the bribes went to the police and the 
Land, Customs and Car-licensing department (East 2000). As 
Pasuk and Sungsidh (1996: 128) argue, corruption in the police 
is of particular significance as it may encourage crime. They 
convincingly point to the linkage between police corruption, the 
rule of law and democracy: 
The appearance of suspected drug-runners and confessed big- 
time gamblers among the ranks of MPs is the result of police 
corruptibility, and has an impact on the image and the 
functioning of democratic institutions. One key pillar of 
democracy is the rule of law and the opportunity of justice for 
all before the law. With a corrupt police, what we have is 
more like the rule of money and the opportunity of perverting 
justice for the benefit of the few' (Pasuk and Sungsidh 1996: 
128). 
Thailand is far from unique. Much too frequently, the role of 
the judiciary is reduced to being a corrupt handmaiden of the 
executive. You Jong Keun, a top Kim Dae Jung aide, contends 
that Asian societies 'did not understand the rule of law'. 
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Without the rule of law, 'accountability, fair competition and 
transparency can be easily violated' (Asiaweek 1999: 53).  In 
addition, checks and balances are 'logical corollaries of the 
doctrine of separation of powers' (Ranney 1995: 198). The 
integration of the three distinct kinds of power-legislative 
(making laws), executive (enforcing laws) and judicial 
(interpreting and applying laws to individual cases)-is the 
very definition of tyranny. 
I Controlled Media and Weak Civil Society 
A weak civil society and media that are controlled by the 
government also contribute to a lack of transparency. Due to 
the overwhelming dominance of state institutions, the role of 
civil organizations is still relatively limited. The state's 
preponderance in Southeast Asian political cultures has been 
likened, rather poetically, to that of a banyan tree: nothing else 
is able to grow under the opulent shade cast by this tree 
(Vatikiotis 1996: 19). 
The majority of non-governmental organizations are de- 
pendent on the state for their legal status and public funds. In 
Indonesia, NGOs had to register with the government within 
two months of their establishment, and if they lacked govern- 
ment approval, they risked 'intimidation and terror from the 
security forces' (ELSAM 1999: 160). Only a small number of 
institutions are truly independent bodies representing grass- 
roots interests. These organizations obtain financing from 
private sources and have been vilified as unpatriotic (especially 
when they draw their support exclusively from Western 
sources) or as representing a foreign culture (Vatikiotis 1996: 
191). Authoritarian regimes strive to put progressive NGOs at a 
disadvantage when these push for democratization, as com- 
pared to conservative groups which toe the government line. 
This is done mainly through legal and practical restrictions on 
the freedoms of assembly, association and expression (ELSAM 
1999: 151). 
Limits on freedom of assembly curb NGO activities without 
actually banning them, thus avoiding international censure. In 
Malaysia, a public gathering of more than five people requires a 
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government permit (Vatiltiotis 1996: 118). Indonesian security 
forces can 'easily raid and close down NGO meetings, seminars 
or discussions on the pretext that the organization lacks official 
permits' (ELSAM 1999: 161). There is mutual distrust between 
governmental and non-governmental institutions. Many 
governments feel threatened by the consciousness-raising and 
public education undertakings of NGOs, fearing that these 
activities will threaten the strategy of mass-depoliticization in 
favour of development (ELSAM 1999: 160). 
There are, however, counter-examples. The Philippines, for 
instance, boasts a dynamic civil society (see Montinola 1999: 
130-133). In Thailand, non-governmental development organi- 
zations (NGDOs) have become prominent in recent years 
(Prudhisan and Maneerat, 1997: 207-210). In Korea, civil society 
has become increasingly diverse, and the government engages 
NGOs on a wide range of issues (see Kim, B.K. 1998: 124). The 
extent of state intervention and crackdowns may be less in 
Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, but NGOs they still have 
to contend with restrictions. 
Restrictions on the freedom of expression and the press 
restrict the inflow of knowledge and therefore power. The 
possible disruption of public order is usually cited as justifi- 
cation for government controls on information. In Malaysia, 
public order is said to be largely based on ethnic 'harmony', 
with racial riots functioning as a bogeyman, and newspapers 
belong to the government coalition. Recently, the Malaysian 
cabinet responded with calls to halt all open debate about 
Malay special rights and the affirmative action policies that 
they entailed after the Chinese Election Appeals Committee or 
Suqiu suggested that they be reviewed and sparked off protests 
from UMNO Youth. It was suggested that closed-door discus- 
sions would be more effective, preserving the spirit of tolerance 
in a multi-racial country such as Malaysia. More significantly, it 
was argued that Malay special rights having been constitution- 
ally enshrined should not be discussed at all (Hamid 2000). 
Thus, whilst the Constitution allows for the civil rights of 
freedom of opinion, information, the media and assembly, these 
are severely curtailed on other equally constitutional grounds. 
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Censorship and the depoliticization of universities are pro- 
moted. Political criticisms directed against official policies or 
against the structure of the political system are very risky. 
Freedom of the press and other media allows a free flow of 
information and consequently independent thought. Though 
most governments in Southeast and East Asia control informa- 
tion and practise censorship, the increasing spread of the Inter- 
net has meant that these governments are slowly losing the 
information war. Not surprisingly, there is a clear connection 
between democratization and free media. This is demonstrated 
by the relative freedom enjoyed by the media in the more 
democratic Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan and Korea. 
The spread of the Internet is vastly heterogeneous in East and 
Southeast Asia. Current numbers of Internet users are very 
difficult to determine (see Ling 1999). With the dramatic 
increase in users, and the near impossibility of censoring it, the 
Internet is expected to play a major role in the future as a means 
of receiving uncensored information. During the height of the 
Anwar Ibrahim trials as well as the recent elections, many 
Malaysians turned to the Internet for information and critical 
insights, citing the newspapers as being too biased towards the 
government. The Internet will thus contribute to democra- 
tization. 
In a liberal democracy, the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches of government act as checks and balances on each 
other. In addition, extra-constitutional agencies such as mass 
media and a vibrant civil society also play a role in assuring 
accountability and transparency. Governments in most of the 
Asian region, however, regard such civilian initiatives as 
dangerous to order, stability and national interests. Civil society 
is highly dependent on information. Laws prohibiting the free 
flow of information are another way of debilitating NGOs. In 
many of the crisis countries, however, journalists risk losing 
their licence, livelihood, liberty and even their life if they do 
what they are supposed to, i.e. inform correctly and without 
prejudice. Fearing this, many practise self-censorship or become 
'running dogs of the government' (David Marshall, quoted in 
Thio 1996: 71) when they should serve as watchdogs. Regimes 
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that lack the checks and balances of civil society and inde- 
pendent media will continue to perpetuate collusion, corrup- 
tion and repression. 
Corruption, Development and Democracy 
Revisited 
We have observed that corruption is rampant and, due to its 
prevalence in many countries in the region, severely affects 
economic activities. Due to electoral corruption, the most 
corrupt rather than the most popular political party may win 
and, in a court of law, the party that has paid a bribe (or the 
biggest bribe) may emerge victorious. We have also seen that 
corruption is a problem, albeit to varying degrees in all five 
crisis economies. According to Transparency International's 
(1998) highly regarded Corruption Perceptions Index, with a 
scale ranging from 10 denoting 'highly clean' to 0 as 'highly 
corrupt', they fared thus: Malaysia 5.3, Korea 4.2, Philippines 
3,3, Thailand 3.0, and Indonesia 2.0. Consequently, fighting 
corruption on all levels will be of paramount importance in the 
countries plagued by this 'social cancer'. 
Economic performance is highly dependent on political 
factors. In the long term, political legitimacy depends on ac- 
countability, responsiveness and honesty, as does political and 
social stability. Corruption undermines legitimacy and stability. 
It raises questions about a government's control over its own 
institutions, personnel and activities as well as its political will 
and capabilities. Malfeasance damages the respect for law and 
public and financial institutions. It erodes the credibility and 
effectiveness of both elected and appointed government 
officials (Rubin 1999). 
Corruption also distorts policy and development objectives. 
It disrupts normal business and public-policy decision-making, 
benefiting the few at the expense of the many. It allows 
financial and human resources to be allocated to inefficient 
uses, often inconsistent with a nation's political and economic 
objectives and needs (Gray and Kaufmann 1998). The impact of 
corruption is even greater on less developed countries since 
scarce resources are diverted from critical priorities (Rubi, 
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1999). The extra costs that bribery entails for businesses drive 
many firms underground, outside of the formal sector, 
undercutting the state's ability to raise revenues through 
taxation. Consequently, the state's ability to provide essential 
public goods, including the rule of law, is reduced (Gray and 
Kaufmann 1998). This in turn creates a conducive environment 
for the proliferation of crime, including organized crime. Thus, 
a vicious cycle of increasing corruption and underground 
economic activity can occur. 
Bribery rewards political ties rather than competence and 
competitiveness, and it privileges unearned income over entre- 
preneurial activity. Corruption thus undermines one of the 
fundamental tenets of democracy: equality of citizens' rights 
(della Porta 1995: 312). It also destroys morale. In a system 
where corruption is the norm, honest politicians and civil 
servants are penalized, hindering the fight against corruption. 
Some have argued that corruption exists everywhere and, as 
a consequence, cannot be so harmful. It has even been said that 
bribery can have positive effects under certain circumstances, 
giving firms and individuals a means of avoiding burdensome 
regulations and ineffective legal systems (Gray and Kaufmann 
1998). Corruption, however, is not the 'grease' that lubricates 
the 'squeaky wheels' of a rigid administration; rather, it puts the 
squeakiness into the wheel by creating excessive and discretion- 
ary regulations. The possibility of bribery is likely to have been 
the cause of the slowdown in the first place. According to the 
1997 World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Survey, 
there is a positive relationship between the extent of bribery 
and the amount of time that enterprise managers spend with 
public officials (Gray and Kaufmann 1998). 
Even if we should remain unconvinced that among other 
factors, corruption was a political cause of the crisis, it has been 
shown that it damages the economy. So do the other 'candi- 
dates' for political causes of the crisis that this paper has 
identified, such as the lack of an independent judiciary, an 
immature civil society, and tightly controlled mass media, 
which leave the government bereft of a much-needed system of 
checks and balances. Without them, there cannot be trans- 
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parency and accountability. Consequently, the question of 
whether they directly contributed to the crash, contagion and 
crisis or did so indirectly is a mere technicality. These problem 
areas constitute an obstacle to sustainable development and 
must be reformed without further ado. 
For more evidence of this we do not have to look any further 
than Indonesia, which is still 'hogging top spot as the biggest 
country risk in ASEAN' (Go 2000). This is largely due to the fact 
that the post-Suharto regimes have yet to divest Indonesia 
sufficiently of corrupt practices. By September 1999, Indonesian 
Corruption Watch had recorded 40 corruption cases involving 
figures in the Habibie administration (McBeth and Cohen, 1999: 
20). President Abdurrahman Wahid's administration is also 
dogged by corruption allegations (Straits Times, 10 August 2000; 
Asmarani 2000). Corruption thus continues to cripple the 
Indonesian economy and prolong the crisis. 
However, even Indonesia has seen the need to adopt 
measures to reduce corruption so as to push towards recovery. 
The pseudo-democratic electoral system has begun to change. 
But the new system is still less than ideal, as the military is 
allowed to nominate 38 members of parliament. Moreover, only 
462 out of 700 MPR members were directly elected during the 
general elections of June 1999. There have also been measures 
put in place to tackle corruption, such as the setting up of a 
panel to expose and remove corrupt members of the judiciary, 
the appointment of 16 new Supreme Court judges, the albeit 
slow process to bring former President Suharto to trial, and the 
revoking of many of the restrictions of media considered 
antagonistic to the Suharto regime (Straits Times, 5 Sept. 2000). 
President Es trada's government has instituted a '10-point Jump- 
start Anti-Corruption Programme' which involves random 
checks on lifestyles of politicians and bureaucrats, adequate 
compensatory packages, free access to public documents 
including government contracts, and a transparent partici- 
patory process for generating nominees for presidential 
appointments in government agencies (Straits Times, 30 August 
2000). Undoubtedly pushed by the crash of 1997, Thailand has 
made substantial progress en route to a reform of the electoral 
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1 system. Thailand has been the most alert in-instituting the 
necessary political reforms. Since September 1997, Thailand has 
passed the most democratic Constitution in the country's 
history, which strengthens classic civil rights, reduces arbitrari- 
, ness by the state and aims to have more competent and stable 
I governments (Doner and Ramsay, 1999: 196). There is a free- 
dom of information act, which has set loose the media hounds 
I 
on every government department - as well as 11 economic re- 
I 
form bills, including the new laws for bankruptcy and corpo- 
I rate restructuring in March 1999 as well as a whole new set of 
laws banning insider dealings and vote-buying by officials 
1 (Friedman 1999). Moreover, an anti-corruption body has been 
I introduced and every politician is obliged to disclose their 
I financial circumstances. South Korea's new President Kim Dae 
I 
I Jung (whose election was probably only possible as a result of 
I the Asian crisis) has begun to introduce significant reforms 
I 
I under difficult conditions. A comprehensive law to prevent 
1 electoral irregularities such as vote-buying has been introduced. 
I Measures aimed at restructuring the banking system, measures 
I improving corporate governance (especially of the chaebols) and 
promoting transparency have been effected (Gluck 2000). 
These reforms are sporadic and may even be merely cos- 
metic. The changes are messy and still accompanied by lots of 
political wrangling and a lack of political will. It will take time 
to evaluate just how deeply the lessons of the economic crisis 
have taken root in the institutions, practices and especially the 
minds of the peoples in this region. There is no doubt that 
much more needs to be done. Civil servants need to be paid 
sufficiently to obviate the need for petty bribes. Backman (1999: 
373ff.) convincingly argues that many laws are rendered 
meaningless if they can be avoided with a small cash payment 
and other gifts. If there are insufficient funds to remunerate 
politicians and civil servants adequately, then the size of the 
bureaucracies should be reduced so as to ensure high wages. 
There must also be good clear laws that can be easily and 
reliably enforced. A well-supervised, soundly regulated and 
competitive financial system that operates on a non-personal 
basis should be established. Prudent banking regulations, 
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auditing and accounting standards must be transparently 
enforced. 
In the battle against corruption, political will is of utmost 
importance. Furthermore, justice must not only be done, it must 
also be seen to be done. Strong, independent anti-corruption 
investigative units with real authority and power have to be 
instituted. A few prominent people implicated for corruption 
must be publicly punished. This will impress upon the people 
the serious intentions of anti-corruption measures and prompt 
them to come forward with complaints and reports. Any 
endeavour to exterminate corruption must engage the co-ope- 
ration of the citizens if it is to succeed. However, amidst the 
contemplation of all the changes yet to be made, there is some 
cause for a cautious optimism. The crisis-hit countries them- 
selves, to a large extent seem to have taken note of the inextri- 
cable links between politics and economics and see the need for 
changes to the current political structure. 
To return to the previously mentioned relationship between 
economic and political development, it is often claimed that 
democracy, although far from perfect, is the best system 
available. Some 'illiberal' democracies, such as Indonesia and 
Malaysia, were consolidated prior to the crisis. This consolida- 
tion, however, differs from 'democratic consolidation', in that 
the stability of these governments is not so much due to legiti- 
macy, but rather achieved by coercion and ruling party hege- 
mony (Diamond 1999). In any event, Indonesia seems to offer a 
counter-example. Suharto had been in power for 32 years and 
yet (or rather because of this fact) Indonesia was perceived as 
politically unstable. Thailand and South Korea, on the other 
hand, have seen changes of government and become more 
democratic, and thus have been perceived 'as more stable in the 
longer run' (Sadli 1999: 18). 
In fact, democratization may be difficult to avoid in the long 
run as it seems to be exceedingly difficult to sustain authori- 
tarian regimes indefinitely. This is not to be taken as a predic- 
tion for the next decade or so, as democratization processes and 
their consolidation take a long time. But there is a historical 
tendency which may be part of a 'fourth wave of democrati- 
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I 
1 zation' (Huntington 1991; Diamond 1999). Waves of democrati- 
1 zation have one thing in common with the Asian crisis, and that 
I is contagion. The 'successful example of one country's transition 
I establishes it as a model for other countries to imitate; once a 
region is sufficiently saturated with democratic political 1 regimes, pressure will mount, compelling the remaining auto- 
cracies to conform to the newly established norm' (Schmitter 
1995: 347). 
! Also, authoritarian governments are undermined by both their economic failure and their economic success. Economic failure obviously makes them unpopular, while economic 
growth leads to increased demands for political participation. 
As Seymour Martin Lipset (1995a: 352) notes, in Taiwan and 
Korea, 'the long-term strengthening of relevant economic and 
social forces under military rule makes democracy feasible, 
while, at the same time, economic downturns or political 
failures may undermine the entrenched dictatorship'. Doubt 
has been cast on a viable, long-term future for the dominant 
party-states in Asia and elsewhere (see Pye 1995: 376). In Japan, 
the Liberal Democratic Party has lost the appearance of 
invincibility, while South Korea and Indonesia have experi- 
enced historical turnovers. 
It has been claimed that Thailand experienced the crash of 
1997 because it was democratic and therefore chaotic (see 
Mallet 1999: 228). But as we have seen, the chaos was rather 
caused by undemocratic practices within a young democracy. 
Similarly, the argument that the Philippines ran into trouble 
because it was democratic is misguided. The vulnerability and 
relative backwardness of the Philippine economy are very 
much a legacy of the sultanistic and kleptocratic Marcos years. 
There is compelling quantitative evidence that the level of 
economic development powerfully shapes the survival 
prospects of democracy, and affluent democracies survive 
without fail. Economic growth lays the foundation for suc- 
cessful democratic consolidation, and there is statistical evi- 
dence that 'the more prosperous a nation is, the greater the 
chances are that it will sustain democracy' (Lipset 1995a: 350). 
With economic development, there is more equality of 
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consumption, a growth of the middle class, more access to 
health care, more education and less illiteracy, and people are 
more likely to ask for increased political freedom (p. 353). On 
the other hand, democracy in moderate-income and especially 
poor countries is much more likely to last when the economy 
grows rapidly, with moderate inflation (see Przeworski et al. 
1996: 41-42). 
In the terrible history of famines in the world, no substantial 
famine has ever occurred in any country with a democratic 
form of government and a relatively free press (Sen 1999a: 92, 
199913: 7-8). Amartya Sen argues that '[the] positive role of 
political and civic rights applies to the prevention of economic 
and social disasters in general' (ibid.). Democracy's protective 
power was badly missed in a country like Indonesia. 
Corruption, on the other hand, not only increases vulnerability 
to crises, but is a significant impediment to implementing 
appropriate responses to crises (Rubin 1999). As there is a high 
correlation between democracy and lower levels of corruption, 
the conclusion is evident that democracy is not a luxury that 
can await the arrival of general prosperity. Democracy's merits 
are not regional in character - discourses such as that of 'Asian 
Democracy' seem to spell more of a dilution of full political 
democracy rather than a cultural adaptation - and neither 
developmental nor cultural conditions should affect the 
freedom of choice. Democratization in the region may be the 
political key to the minimization of the chances of future crises. 
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Notes 
1. This translates into, 'after it therefore because of it'. 
2. There exists a vast literature on the economic and financial causes of the 
crisis. For a brief summary see, for instance, Rudolph 2000: 16-23. 
3. Whereas corruption can be found in even the least corrupt countries, 
kleptocracies are defined as states that are dominated by corruption or in 
which corruption is a major means of capital accumulation. The term 
'kleptocracy' was first used by Stanislav Andreski in 1966 as an analytical 
tool for polities in Africa and Latin America ( Alatas 1997: 299). 
4. Hing Ai Yun puts the Singapore top officials' salaries into an inter- 
national perspective in her contribution to this issue. 
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